Regrettably, an Orthodox apologist has apostatized from the faith and is exploring Roman Catholicism quite militantly. He created a pseudonym “Hieronymus Catholic” to further his cause. Sadly losing the charity and humility found in his earlier writings, this new incarnation brings with himself the same unpolished acuity with a wit and subdued malevolence. Similarly, he likewise carries over an over-reliance on secondary sources and narrow readings from the primary sources, which he has evidently not read in their completeness.

In Part 1, we covered the bulk of Hieornymus Catholic’s polemic against myself on the subject of Augustine. Here, we finish the job discussing his mistreatment of Augustine’s psychological trinities.

Augustine’s Psychological Trinities and Ramifications Upon the Spirit’s Eternal Procession. Most people approach Augustine with many preconceived notions when reading On the Trinity, particularly with eyes upon the debate surrounding the filioque. One must be mindful that this was not the concern Augustine had. Rather, he was in disputes with Semi-Arians (as Response to Maximinus makes clear).

As a weapon against the Semi-Arians, Augustine decides to prove the Nicene-Constantinopolitan doctrine of one God of one essence in three hypostases by employing psychological analogies. The logic is that man is made in the image of God’s essence, and so within man are images of the Trinity’s hypostases.

The most famous of these examples is love, which Augustine reflects:

And although love is referred to the mind that loves [Father], whose love it is; nevertheless it is also love in respect to itself [mind receives its own beloved, i.e. Son], so as to exist also in itself: since love too is loved [i.e. the Spirit], yet cannot be loved with anything except with love, that is with itself. (9.8; All citations unless otherwise stated are from On the Trinity)

Augustine literally cites Saint Athanasius as inspiration for the preceding breakdown citing “Athanasius” who “remarks that Christ here prays that the disciples ‘may imitate the trinitarian unity of essence, in their unity of affection.’”

In short, the existence of there existing in a singular essence (i.e. a man) an indivisible Trinity (such as his mind’s love for its own knowledge, vision, etcetera) shows that the Nicene doctrine exists in the image of God. And, if it exists in the image of God, it applies likewise to God.

With the preceding in mind, inferring details specific to modern East-West differences on Pneumatology must be done with the caution that these details are secondary to Augustine’s actual endeavor. With that in mind, let’s unpack Augustine’s logic.

Identifying the Hypostatic Analogues in Augustine. Perhaps the most basic premise one must adhere to, when reading Augustine’s analogies, is that all his references to the “mind” are analogies of the Father. The second most basic premise one must adhere to is that whatever in the analogy unites the mind towards something else (some entity that is then understood or grasped by the mind/sentient entity) is an analogy of the Holy Spirit. Critical interpretative errors result when one does not apply these presumptions.

Sadly, Augustine does not go out and say “the mind is the Father” or “the uniter is the Spirit.” So, let’s briefly establish these premises:

knowledge bears a likeness to that which it knows, that is, of which it is the knowledge; in this case it has perfect and equal likeness, when the mind itself, which knows, is known. And so it is both image and word; because it is uttered concerning that mind to which it is equalled in knowing, and that which is begotten is equal to the begetter. (9.16)

Here, “knowledge” is obviously an analogue to the Word/Son because it is the “perfect and equal likeness” of “the mind itself.” “It [knowledge/a spoken word] is both image and word,” obviously a reference to Col 1:15 and John 1:1. “It is…begotten” and “equal to the begetter.” If at any point, the interpreter recasts the mind as anything other than the Father, it is clear Augustine’s intended analogy falls apart.

This is made clearer a little later, where Augustine includes the Spirit’s role as the “uniter” in the analogies:

Therefore, the bringing forth [Son] of the mind [Father] is preceded by some desire [Spirit], by which, through seeking and finding what we wish to know, the offspring, viz. knowledge itself, is born. (9.18)

Here, “knowledge” (the Son) is “brought forth” (begotten) from the “mind” through “some desire…seeking and finding.” The role of mind in the generation of knowledge is a clear parallel with the Father begetting the Son. Interestingly, against nearly all Western presuppositions of what Augustine believes about the Spirit’s origin respective of the Son, Augustine appears to state that the Spirit “preceded…the offspring [the Son].” What this means is not some sort of prior eternal order of the Spirit viz a viz the Son. This is because Augustine views the “uniter” as only manifest when it joins what it unites with to its source. In Augustine’s lingo, this is called “rest” or “resting.”

Before unpacking what “resting” is, let’s firmly establish the Spirit’s role as “uniter.” When Augustine invokes “the will which unites both, viz. the quasi-parent and the quasi-child, is more spiritual than either of them…,” (11.9) he explains that this same “will which unites both is confessedly more spiritual, as I have said; and so it begins to suggest (insinuare), as it were, the person of the Spirit in the Trinity…” (Ibid.) One cannot get any clearer in identifying any of the analogies than this. Placing as he does the will/uniter between “the quasi-parent and the quasi-child,” it is clear that “parent” is a reference to the Father and “child” is a reference to the Son.

In the analogues, the Son is the hardest to identify because His analogy keeps changing. Sometimes He is given an obvious analogy, such as the spoken word (Word). Other times, He is given something less obvious, such as being the beloved or vision. However, because the Father’s role as the mind/sentient entity and the Spirit’s as uniter are so clear and consistent within the analogies, this makes identifying the Son easy. The Son is always the object/idea that the mind/sentient entity grasps intellectually/spiritually.

The Doctrine of Rest in Augustine. In one section, Augustine speaks of how “the mind knows itself, it alone is the parent of its own knowledge.” (9.18) Thanks to the preceding, one can near automatically decode what he is saying “the Father is the parent/origin of the Son.” He continues: “In knowing itself, then, it begets a knowledge of itself equal to itself.” (Ibid.) This is clear enough—the Son is equal to the Father. What follows is a critically important section, which I will make available to the reader in full before parsing:

Why therefore may it [the mind] not be said by loving itself to have begotten its own love [to know], as by knowing itself it has begotten its own knowledge? Is it because it is thereby indeed plainly shown that this is the principle of love, ***whence*** it proceeds? For it proceeds ***from*** the mind itself, which is lovable to itself before it loves itself, and so [the mind] is the principle of its own love by which it loves itself; but that this love is not therefore rightly said to be begotten by the mind, as is the knowledge of itself by which the mind knows itself, because in the case of knowledge the thing has been found already [i.e. knowledge already exists], which is what we call brought forth or discovered [i.e. begotten]; and this is commonly preceded by an inquiry such as to ***find rest*** when that end is attained. For inquiry is the desire of finding, or, what is the same thing, of discovering. But those things which are discovered are as it were brought forth, whence they are like offspring; but wherein, except in the case itself of knowledge? For in that case they are as it were uttered and fashioned. For although the things existed already which we found by seeking, yet the knowledge of them did not exist, which knowledge we regard as an offspring that is born. Further, the desire (appetitus) which there is in seeking proceeds from him who seeks, and is in some way in suspense, and does not rest in the end whither it is directed, except that which is sought be found and conjoined with him who seeks. And this desire, that is, inquiry — although it does not seem to be love, by which that which is known is loved, for in this case we are still striving to know — yet it is something of the same kind. For it [desire] can be called will (voluntas),since every one who seeks wills (vult) to find…

Now dear reader, allow what you just read to marinate in light of what we have already established concerning the analogies’ identities. The following parsing is not an “astronomical projection.” It is clearly the only honest interpretation one can draw.

Why therefore may it [the mind] not be said by loving itself to have begotten its own love [to know], as by knowing itself it has begotten its own knowledge? Is it because it is thereby indeed plainly shown that this is the principle of love, ***whence*** it proceeds? For it proceeds ***from*** the mind itself, which is lovable to itself before it loves itself…

The “mind” (Father) does not beget its own “love [to know]” (i.e. the Spirit) when begetting ”knowledge.” Rather, from “this…the principle [i.e. cause] of love,” one can infer from where (“whence”) it proceeds: “from the mind itself.”

…and so [the mind] is the principle of its own love by which it loves itself; but that this love is not therefore rightly said to be begotten by the mind, as is the knowledge of itself by which the mind knows itself, because in the case of knowledge the thing has been found already…

“Knowledge of itself [the mind]” is “begotten by the mind,” but love’s (the Spirit’s) “principle” cause is the “mind.” Why? “[B]ecause in the case of knowledge the thing [to know] has been found already.” In other words, procession differs from generation because the latter is a mutually exclusive event. This takes us to the doctrine of “rest,” which immediately follows:

which is what we call brought forth or discovered [i.e. begotten]; and this is commonly preceded by an inquiry such as to ***find rest*** when that end is attained. For inquiry is the desire of finding, or, what is the same thing, of discovering.

“Knowledge” when it is “found already”/”discovered” is “preceded by an inquiry” which “find[s] rest when that end [the discovery of knowledge] is attained.” “Inquiry is the desire” or “love,” “of finding.” Hence, the procession of love precedes knowledge so that the latter can even be found. “Rest” occurs when it is found, thereby completing the procession process.

The ramifications of the preceding are obvious. The Spirit’s procession does not precede the Son’s generation. Rather, the beginning of this “inquiry” (procession) precedes the generation of the Son, but on the other hand only really competes itself when the generation is complete. In other words, generation is completed at the same “time” (i.e. eternal order) as procession is, as procession (inquiry) is only complete upon knowledge’s discovery. This is why “the Father is the beginning of the whole divinity” (4.29), something Augustine states when explicitly rejecting that Spirit is “from” the Son in any way other than in His “send[ing],” “a significant economy” in Augustine’s own words. (Ibid.)

Immediately after the preceding, Augustine makes clear that Knowledge=the Son.

But those things which are discovered are as it were brought forth, whence they are like offspring; but wherein, except in the case itself of knowledge? For in that case they are as it were uttered and fashioned. For although the things existed already which we found by seeking, yet the knowledge of them did not exist, which knowledge we regard as an offspring that is born.

Augustine carefully delineates two things. Outside of the analogy, the things we know precede knowing them. This article existed before you knew/discovered it. However, the knowledge of this article did not exist. The knowledge of this article was “born” in the reader’s mind when they found it.

As per the analogy, the Son Himself is only generated when the desire/love for Him (the Spirit’s procession) is completed (i.e. “finds rest when that end is attained”).

Augustine immediately continues:

Further, the desire (appetitus) which there is in seeking proceeds from him who seeks, and is in some way in suspense, and does not rest in the end whither it is directed, except that which is sought be found and conjoined with him who seeks. And this desire, that is, inquiry — although it does not seem to be love, by which that which is known is loved, for in this case we are still striving to know — yet it is something of the same kind. For it [desire] can be called will (voluntas), since every one who seeks wills (vult) to find…

As one can see, the interpretations given here are literally described by Augustine. He further specifies that “it [desire] can be called will,” which connects what was stated here to 11.9. The “uniting” function of the “will” is manifestly the same as “inquiry”/”love” which unite the intentions of the “mind” towards its desired end (“knowledge.”)

In short, the analogy presented by Augustine evidences such a contrary logic to double procession, primary and secondary causes, and etcetera of the Holy Spirit, that one can only with pains anachronistically recast Augustine as teaching modern Western conceptions of the “double procession” Filioque.

The Spirit’s Procession From the Father Alone Derived From Analogy. When writing an article such as this, one is forced to make judgement calls as to what is not quoted or treated. In the interests of space and clarity, let’s zero in on Augustine’s treatment of internal vision. Augustine has two analogies for vision, external and internal:

there are two kinds of vision, the one of [sensuous] perception (sentientis), the other of conception (cogitantis)…I have, therefore, chosen to put forward two trinities in this kind: one when the vision of [sensuous] perception is formed from the bodily object, the other when the vision of conception is formed from the memory….in all cases the will does not appear unless as the combiner as it were of parent and offspring; and so, proceed from whence it may, it can be called neither parent nor offspring. (11.16)

Augustine makes clear that in vision, “the will” fulfills the function of the Spirit–not that of the “parent” (Father) or “offspring” (the Son). If one fails to identify which kind of vision Augustine is discussing, this can lead to obvious confusion as to which analogue fulfills the role of which Hypostasis. Nevertheless, the Spirit may easily be identified as the analogue that fulfills the function of “will” or uniter, as previously established.

Internal vision is the analogy that weighs more heavily in Augustine’s thought. Augustine touches on it a few times in Book 10 (10.4, 7) and in one section makes an observation which is interpretatively important, but easy to gloss over:

As therefore the mind is within, it goes forth in some sort from itself, when it exerts the affection of love towards these, as it were, footprints of many acts of attention. And these footprints are, as it were, imprinted on the memory, at the time when the corporeal things which are without are perceived in such way, that even when those corporeal things are absent, yet the images of them are at hand to those who think of them. Therefore let the mind become acquainted with itself, and not seek itself as if it were absent; but fix upon itself the act of [voluntary] attention, by which it was wandering among other things, and let it think of itself. (10.11)

In this discussion of internal vision, when the “mind” (here conflated with “memory”) seeks to see “corporeal things [that] are absent” it “fix[es] upon itself [the mind] the act of attention” which is conflated with “the affection of love.” In other words, “love” and the mind’s “attention” are the same thing. If “love” is an analogy for the Spirit, then “attention” manifestly is as well.

In Book 11, discussion of vision begins in earnest. Augustine writes of both external and internal vision. I will include almost the whole paragraph in full before parsing it:

When, then, we see any corporeal object, these three things, as is most easy to do, are to be considered and distinguished: First, the object itself which we see; whether a stone, or flame, or any other thing that can be seen by the eyes; and this certainly might exist also already before it was seen; next, vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist before we perceived the object itself which is presented to the sense; in the third place, that which keeps the sense of the eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention of the mind. In these three, then, not only is there an evident distinction, but also a diverse nature. [i.e. they are literally two different essences] For, first, that visible body is of a far different nature from the sense of the eyes, through the incidence of which sense upon it vision arises. And what plainly is vision itself other than perception informed by that thing which is perceived? Although there is no vision if the visible object be withdrawn, nor could there be any vision of the kind at all if there were no body that could be seen; yet the body by which the sense of the eyes is informed, when that body is seen, and the form itself which is imprinted by it upon the sense, which is called vision, are by no means of the same substance. For the body that is seen is, in its own nature, separable; but the sense, which was already in the living subject, even before it saw what it was able to see, when it fell in with something visible — or the vision which comes to be in the sense from the visible body when now brought into connection with it and seen — the sense, then, I say, or the vision, that is, the sense informed from without, belongs to the nature of the living subject, which is altogether other than that body which we perceive by seeing, and by which the sense is not so formed as to be sense, but as to be vision. For unless the sense were also in us before the presentation to us of the sensible object, we should not differ from the blind, at times when we are seeing nothing, whether in darkness, or when our eyes are closed. But we differ from them in this, that there is in us, even when we are not seeing, that whereby we are able to see, which is called the sense; whereas this is not in them, nor are they called blind for any other reason than because they have it not. Further also, that attention of the mind which keeps the sense in that thing which we see, and connects both, not only differs from that visible thing in its nature; in that the one is mind, and the other body; but also from the sense and the vision itself: since this attention is the act of the mind alone…And this sense, too, is cut off and extinguished by suffering on the part of the body, when any one is blinded; while the mind remains the same; and its attention, since the eyes are lost, has not, indeed, the sense of the body which it may join, by seeing, to the body without it, and so fix its look thereupon and see it, yet by the very effort shows that, although the bodily sense be taken away, itself can neither perish nor be diminished. For there remains unimpaired a desire [appetitus] of seeing, whether it can be carried into effect or not. These three, then, the body that is seen, and vision itself, and the attention of mind which joins both together, are manifestly distinguishable, not only on account of the properties of each, but also on account of the difference of their natures.

Now let’s parse it, because within this passage is an unequivocal statement of the Spirit’s procession from the Father alone.

In discussing external vision, Augustine states the following:

When, then, we see any corporeal object, these three things, as is most easy to do, are to be considered and distinguished: First, the object itself which we see; whether a stone, or flame, or any other thing that can be seen by the eyes; and this certainly might exist also already before it was seen; next, vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist before we perceived the object itself which is presented to the sense; in the third place, that which keeps the sense of the eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention of the mind. In these three, then, not only is there an evident distinction, but also a diverse nature. [i.e. they are literally two different essences]

Here, Augustine seemingly creates a Trinity of object-vision-attention of mind. The interpreter is to understand that this is not actually the Trinity Augustine intends to pose, because there are a diversity of substances/essences. This would be contrary to his polemical purpose, explaining why he in some length apologizes for the analogy of external vision:

For, first, that visible body is of a far different nature from the sense of the eyes, through the incidence of which sense upon it vision arises. And what plainly is vision itself other than perception informed by that thing which is perceived? Although there is no vision if the visible object be withdrawn, nor could there be any vision of the kind at all if there were no body that could be seen; yet the body by which the sense of the eyes is informed, when that body is seen, and the form itself which is imprinted by it upon the sense, which is called vision, are by no means of the same substance. For the body that is seen is, in its own nature, separable; but the sense, which was already in the living subject, even before it saw what it was able to see, when it fell in with something visible — or the vision which comes to be in the sense from the visible body when now brought into connection with it and seen — the sense, then, I say, or the vision, that is, the sense informed from without, belongs to the nature of the living subject, which is altogether other than that body which we perceive by seeing, and by which the sense is not so formed as to be sense, but as to be vision.

Augustine’s purpose in the preceding is to establish that “the sense” of vision “belongs to the nature of the living subject” and is thereby independent of the foreign object necessary for external vision. From this he concludes:

For unless the sense were also in us before the presentation to us of the sensible object, we should not differ from the blind, at times when we are seeing nothing, whether in darkness, or when our eyes are closed. But we differ from them in this, that there is in us, even when we are not seeing, that whereby we are able to see, which is called the sense; whereas this is not in them, nor are they called blind for any other reason than because they have it not. Further also, that attention of the mind which keeps the sense in that thing which we see, and connects both…

In short, external vision in fact is internal vision with an external object. This is because even when one closes their eyes, seeing no external object, vision still exists. Augustine now clarifies that the “attention of the mind which keeps the sense in that thing which we see…connects both.” This uniting function belongs to the Spirit, consistent with 10.11. Hence, external vision isn’t a Trinity of object-vision-and attention of the mind; but rather a Trinity of the vision-attention of the mind-mind.

With this in mind, let’s continue….

…[the attention of the mind] not only differs from that visible thing in its nature; in that the one is mind, and the other body; but also from the sense and the vision itself: since this attention is the act of the mind alone…

Augustine plainly states what unites the vision (here of a “visible thing in its nature,” the “sense and the vision itself”) with the mind is “attention.” “Attention,” the process of inquiring into a vision, “is the act of the mind alone.” In other words, the Spirit’s procession is the act of the Father alone.

Augustine then discusses more specifically what internal vision is:

And this sense [vision], too, is cut off and extinguished by suffering on the part of the body, when any one is blinded; while the mind remains the same; and its attention, since the eyes are lost, has not, indeed, the sense of the body which it may join, by seeing, to the body without it, and so fix its look thereupon and see it, yet by the very effort shows that, although the bodily sense be taken away, itself can neither perish nor be diminished. For there remains unimpaired a desire [appetitus] of seeing, whether it can be carried into effect or not. These three, then, the body that is seen, and vision itself, and the attention of mind which joins both together, are manifestly distinguishable, not only on account of the properties of each, but also on account of the difference of their natures.

Augustine makes clear that vision is not dependent upon externals, because even being blinded vision “can neither perish nor be diminished.” He conflates “attention” here with “a desire of seeing,” justifying conflating “attention” with “will,” “inquiry,” “love,” and etcetera.

How does internal vision work? According to Augustine:

Since even if the form of the body, which was corporeally perceived, be withdrawn, its likeness remains in the memory, to which the will may again direct its eye, so as to be formed thence from within, as the sense was formed from without by the presentation of the sensible body. And so that trinity is produced from memory, from internal vision, and from the will which unites both…but in place of that bodily species which was perceived from without, there comes the memory retaining that species which the soul has imbibed through the bodily sense; and in place of that vision which was outward when the sense was informed through the sensible body, there comes a similar vision within, while the eye of the mind is informed from that which the memory retains, and the corporeal things that are thought of are absent; and the will itself, as before it applied the sense yet to be informed to the corporeal thing presented from without, and united it thereto when informed, so now converts the vision of the recollecting mind to memory, in order that the mental sight may be informed by that which the memory has retained, and so there may be in the conception a like vision. (11.6)

Internal images in the memory/mind fulfill the function of external objects. As one can see, the function of attention/will remains the same for both external and internal vision, justifying the inferences drawn above. Augustine in the next paragraph says this explicitly: “a certain unity of three things may therein take place, although their nature is diverse, that, the same intention of the will is towards combining the image of the body which is in the memory.” (11.7)

With the preceding, 11.9 can be understood in its full context:

Therefore the will which unites both, viz. the quasi-parent and the quasi-child, is more spiritual than either of them…the will which unites both is confessedly more spiritual, as I have said; and so it begins to suggest (insinuare), as it were, the person of the Spirit in the Trinity…It does not therefore proceed from that bodily thing as from a parent; yet neither does it proceed from that other as it were offspring, namely, the vision and form that is in the sense. For the will existed before the vision came to pass, which will applied the sense that was to be formed to the bodily thing that was to be discerned; but it was not yet satisfied. For how could that which was not yet seen satisfy? And satisfaction means a will that rests content. And, therefore, we can neither call the will the quasi-offspring of vision, since it existed before vision; nor the quasi-parent, since that vision was not formed and expressed from the will, but from the bodily thing that was seen. (11.9)

Augustine, in no uncertain terms, identifies the “Spirit” as the Person who “unites” the Father and Son. He reiterates, just as in 9.18, that the Spirit’s procession in preceding the Son in some sense differentiates His origin from generation. Additionally Augustine disallows for the will to proceed from the vision. This renders impossible any attempt to recast mind as the Son and the vision as the Father, in opposition to internal vision’s discussion in 10.11. Also, just like in 9.18, this procession is only fully completed upon resting “content” in its destination (the Son). In 11.10 Augustine states more succinctly: “we can rightly call vision the end and rest of the will…the end of the will is the vision; for it is manifest.” This is not possible if the vision is the Father. The interpretation I pose here is internally consistent. Augustine is clearly speaking about the same Trinitarian reality, in the same way, in both analogies.

Putting Book 15, Par 47 to Rest. In one of history’s chief ironies, the very source the used as a double procession proof text contradicts modern, Western notions of the filioque. Thanks to unpacking to preceding, this in plain for all to see:

Are we therefore able to ask whether the Holy Spirit had already proceeded from the Father when the Son was born, or had not yet proceeded; and when He was born, proceeded from both, wherein there is no such thing as distinct times: just as we have been able to ask, in a case where we do find times, that the will proceeds from the human mind first, in order that that may be sought which, when found, may be called offspring; which offspring being already brought forth or born, that will is made perfect, resting in this end, so that what had been its desire when seeking, is its love when enjoying; which love now proceeds from both, i.e. from the mind that begets, and from the notion that is begotten, as if from parent and offspring? These things it is absolutely impossible to ask in this case, where nothing is begun in time, so as to be perfected in a time following. Wherefore let him who can understand the generation of the Son from the Father without time, understand also the procession of the Holy Spirit from both without time. (15.47)

Augustine begins by asking “whether the Holy Spirit had already proceeded from the Father when the Son was born,” to which he dodges by saying there was “no such thing as distinct times.” In other words, in eternity there is no chronology in which to answer the question as stated.

Augustine then asks a question that is answerable:

we have been able to ask, in a case where we do find times, that the will proceeds from the human mind first, in order that that may be sought which, when found, may be called offspring; which offspring being already brought forth or born, that will is made perfect, resting in this end…

In other words, we can ask whether “the will proceeds from the human mind first,” before whatever (knowledge, vision, the beloved) “that may be sought which, when found, may be called offspring.” The answer has a presumed upon answer, already established in Books 9 and 11: yes, provided that the “offspring being already brought forth” when the “will is made perfect, resting in this end.” It is precisely this understanding, as delineated in these books and explained above, that Augustine himself defines as the filioque:

so that what had been its desire when seeking, is its love when enjoying; which love now proceeds from both, i.e. from the mind that begets, and from the notion that is begotten, as if from parent and offspring?

Love/desire/will/inquiry/attention “proceeds from both” as a result of the love/etcetera proceeding from the Father to its desired end, the Son. In other words, procession from “both” does not mean causal origin from both, as what Augustine explains explicitly excludes this. Rather, it pertains to both, the origin being the Father and the end being the Son.

The Answer to HC. Having done all the work to flesh out Augustine’s psychological trinities, one can then quickly answer HC’s polemic. According to HC, “Craig never [tries to] justify his hermeneutic of using obscure teachings to understand clear ones.”

For one, Augustine felt these Trinities were sufficiently clear, which is precisely why I concur with him in emphasizing them. Augustine writes in Book 11, Par 1: “Let us seek, then, so far as we can, in that which perishes, some image of the Trinity, if not so express, yet perhaps more easy to be discerned.” Augustine dedicated four books of On the Trinity (Books 9-11, 14) to the analogies and refers to them elsewhere, such as in Books 12-13. Second, being that I avoided the transparent instances of eisegesis that HC had as shown in Part I, I feel that I have more plainly have taken a clear statement (such as in 4.29) and explained its thorough demonstration in Books 9-11.

On another note, according to HC, I “butchered” a quote (11.9-10). One can see that approaching the psychological Trinities in any sort of detail is not a short endeavor. He then, in fitting irony, offers a “counter citation” of 520 words split between non-adjacent paragraphs. Clearly, this indicates the difficulty in summarizing Augustine’s thought without spilling 5,500 words as were done so above.

Finally, HC’s exegesis and rejoinder is all wrong—literally. He misapprehends what the analogues are which I have painstakingly demonstrated above. For example, HC claims (with no textual justification) that “the Father corresponds to the bodily/visible object that is seen.” HC literally sees everything backwards!

He offers no explanation why the Father suddenly changed identity between Books 9-10 and Book 11, nor how statements clearly identifying the “vision” as something of an offspring can possibly be the Father (i.e. “that vision…when it is conceived, then from that form which the memory retains…is the quasi-offspring of that which the memory retains,” 11.11).

If the will proceeds from the human mind first as 15.47 explicitly states, then clearly the human mind must be a reference to the Father. If the will rests afterwards, what it rests in is clearly the Son. HC demands that vision follows the opposite order, which is why one knows his interpretation is wrong.

Lastly, and most plainly, he does not seem to recognize Augustine’s parsing of internal and external vision.

Transparently missing the point, in eisegeting 15.47 HC claims:

Augustine is actually not harkening back to the analogy that he cited from book 11. As demonstrated above, in that analogy [in Book 11], the Father was the object seen, the Son was the act of vision, and the Spirit was the act of will. In this analogy [in Book 15], however, Augustine seemingly identifies the Father as mind, the Son as offspring of the mind, and the Spirit as will. [FYI as per 9.18]

If one does not arbitrarily assume divorced from the text of Books 9-11 that Augustine shifted all his analogies, HC’s objection evaporates. Augustine in 11.9 conflates the vision analogy to that of mind-knowledge-will as found in 9.18. Following an identical schema, the interpreter cannot but understand Augstine’s discussion in 15.47 as demonstrating the same points as the analogies in Books 9 and 11.

HC interestingly adds the additional objection that Augustine disallows for answering questions about the Spirit’s origin. Yet, HC contradictorily does answer Augustine’s “unanswerable” question from 15.47 in favor of double procession. With this, he concedes that Augustine does allow for answering the question in some sense. However, unlike HC who disregards Augustine’s analogies in interpreting the passage, as per Augustine himself, the reader is supposed to interpret the nature of his analogy as I discuss above.

HC surely did not set out to expound the exact opposite of the truth. And so, when he accuses me of “nonsense” and jumping “to the insane conclusion that this somehow means the Spirit hypostatically proceeds from the Father alone” in reference to 11.2, how would he in light of the overwhelming evidence describe himself? And what sort of spirit inspires such vitriol?

HC ends simply copy and pasting a quote mine with out-of-context filioque-sounding quotes. With this his endeavor comes to an unimpressive end.

Epilogue. There is no need to belabor the exercise here. In short, if one sticks with the facts and does not depend upon inferences foreign from Augustine’s text or angry rhetorical flailing, the conclusion that Augustine was Pneumatologically Orthodox is inescapable. Those who respond to the case made here with logical fallacies like ad hominenms and appeals to authority merely concede they don’t have the facts to dispute the conclusion of this study.